American Economic Review Vol. 116 No. 4 2026
Similarity of Information and Collective Action
open access
Abstract
We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.20241056
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1189-1233
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref