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Similarity of Information and Collective Action

Deepal Basak¹; Joyee Deb²; Aditya Kuvalekar³

¹ Indiana University (email: ) · ² New York University (email: ) · ³ University of Essex (email: )

We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision. (JEL C71, D71, D72, D81, D82, D83, H41)

DOI

10.1257/aer.20241056

Volume

116 (4)

Pages

1189-1233

Language

en

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