Review of Economic Studies Vol. 51 No. 3 1984

The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms

William Thomson^1,2

¹ Harvard University · ² University of Minnesota

Abstract

The vulnerability to manipulate behaviour of resource allocation mechanisms is evaluated by determining the Nash equilibria of associated manipulation games. Under manipulation, all monotonic correspondences are essentially equivalent to the Walrasian correspondence. For most non-monotonic correspondences of interest, the initial position appears at equilibrium to be efficient.

DOI

10.2307/2297433

Volume

51

Issue

3

Pages

447

Sources

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