A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures With Public Goods

Jean-Jacques Laffont; Eric Maskin

doi:10.2307/2296963

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A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures With Public Goods

Jean-Jacques Laffont¹; Eric Maskin²

¹ Université Toulouse-I-Capitole · ² Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Review of Economic Studies 1983

This paper provides a systematic study of planning procedures with public goods in which local truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy. These procedures are said to be strongly locally individually incentive compatible (SLIIC). We first characterize the (time invariant) continuously differentiable planning procedures that are SLIIC. Then, we study properties such as balancedness, cheatproofness with respect to coalitions, neutrality, individual rationality and we point out the connection with the MDP procedures.

DOI: 10.2307/2296963
Volume: 50 (1)
Pages: 171
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