Review of Economic Studies Vol. 50 No. 1 1983

A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures With Public Goods

Jean-Jacques Laffont¹; Eric Maskin²

¹ Université Toulouse-I-Capitole · ² Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abstract

This paper provides a systematic study of planning procedures with public goods in which local truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy. These procedures are said to be strongly locally individually incentive compatible (SLIIC). We first characterize the (time invariant) continuously differentiable planning procedures that are SLIIC. Then, we study properties such as balancedness, cheatproofness with respect to coalitions, neutrality, individual rationality and we point out the connection with the MDP procedures.

DOI

10.2307/2296963

Volume

50

Issue

1

Pages

171

Sources

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