Review of Economic Studies Vol. 50 No. 1 1983

Myopic Versus Intertemporal Manipulation in Decentralized Planning Procedures

Guy Laroque^1,2; Jean-Charles Rochet^1,3

¹ Centre de Recherche en Mathématiques de la Décision · ² ENSAE Paris · ³ Centre d'Études et d'Expertise sur les Risques, l'Environnement, la Mobilité et l'Aménagement

Abstract

Manipulation is studied in abstract planning procedures in exchange economies with private goods and a generalization of the results of Champsaur-Laroque (1980) is obtained. When the Nash equilibrium corresponding to myopic manipulation is unique, the outcome of consistent intertemporal manipulation on a time interval [0, T] is characterized. It is shown that when T goes to infinity, the resulting allocation tends towards a competitive equilibrium. For T equal to infinity, there exists a Nash equilibrium only when the initial allocation is Pareto-optimal.

DOI

10.2307/2296964

Volume

50

Issue

1

Pages

187

Sources

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