The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 48 No. 3 1966
An Economic Theory of Alliances
Abstract
The report presents a new theoretical model of military alliances and other international organizations. The assumptions basic to the model are that nations act in their own best interests and that there is a 'public goods' aspect to all joint undertakings. The main conclusions drawn from the analysis are that (1) a less than optimal amount of resources will be devoted to an alliance or other international organization; (2) the burden of an alliance will be borne in a disproportional way, the larger members paying more than their proportional share. Empirical data from NATO and the United Nations are presented in support of these conclusions.
- DOI
- 10.2307/1927082
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 266
- Sources
- crossref openalex