From the Fringe to the Fore: Labor Unions and Employee Compensation
The Review of Economics and Statistics
2020
Conventional wisdom suggests that labor unions raise worker wages, while the newer empirical literature finds only negligible earnings effects. I reconcile this apparent contradiction by arguing that collective bargaining targets fringe benefits. Using U.S. firm-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Multinational Enterprise Survey and Compustat, I exploit a regression discontinuity in majority rule union elections to compare changes in employee compensation at firms whose establishment barely won a union election against those that barely lost an election. Following unionization, average employee compensation and employer pension contributions increase, which raises the labor share of compensation.
- DOI
- 10.1162/rest_a_00803
- Volume
- 102 (1)
- Pages
- 98-112
- Language
- en
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- Sources
- openalex crossref