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The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 80 No. 4 1998

Branch Banking and the Geography of Bank Pricing

Paul S. Calem1,2; Leonard I. Nakamura3

1 Federal Reserve · 2 Federal Reserve Board of Governors · 3 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract

We show that bank branching tends to mitigate localized market power by broadening the geographic scope of competition among banks, even though branch banking allows banks to differentiate themselves through their choices of branch locations. Banking services at peripheral locations will be priced more competitively when those locales are served by branch networks. We develop a theoretical model in support of this view and offer empirical evidence.

DOI
10.1162/003465398557681
Volume
80
Issue
4
Pages
600-610
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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