’Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families

Rossella Calvi; Ajinkya Keskar

doi:10.1162/rest_a_01399

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’Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families

Rossella Calvi¹; Ajinkya Keskar²

¹ Rice University · ² Binghamton University, SUNY

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2026

We develop a noncooperative bargaining model with incomplete information linking dowry payments, domestic violence, resource allocation between a husband and a wife, and separation. Our model generates several predictions, which we test empirically using amendments to the Indian antidowry law as a natural experiment. We document a decline in women’s bargaining power and separations and a surge in domestic violence following the amendments. These unintended effects are attenuated when social stigma against separation is low and, in some circumstances, when gains from marriage are high. Whenever possible, parents increase investment in their daughters’ human capital to compensate for lower dowries.

DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01399
Volume: 108 (1)
Pages: 129-144
Language: en
Export: BibTeX
Sources: openalex crossref