The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 77 No. 1 1995
Games the States Don't Play: Welfare Benefits and the Theory of Fiscal Federalism
Abstract
Fiscal federalism theory predicts that states will behave strategically in welfare programs because voter demand for welfare is sensitive to tax price, while the tax price itself changes because of welfare-induced migration. This paper tests these propositions on AFDC in the United States for a panel from 1982-88 using new models for the determination of the recipiency ratio (the tax price) and composite neighbors. The data do not support any substantial tax price elasticity of demand for welfare. Estimates of migration effects on tax price are found to be sensitive to specification.
- DOI
- 10.2307/2110005
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 183
- Sources
- crossref openalex