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Friend or Foe? Cooperation and Learning in High-Stakes Games

Felix Oberholzer‐Gee; Joel Waldfogel^1,2; Matthew W. White^1,2

¹ California University of Pennsylvania · ² University of Pennsylvania

Why do people frequently cooperate in defiance of their immediate incentives? One explanation is that individuals are conditionally cooperative. As an explanation of behavior in one-shot settings, such preferences require individuals to be able to discern their opponents' preferences. Using data from a television game show, we provide evidence about how individuals implement conditionally cooperative preferences. We show that contestants forgo large sums of money to be cooperative; they cooperate at heightened levels when their opponents are predictably cooperative; and they fare worse when their observable characteristics predict less cooperation because opponents avoid cooperating with them.

DOI

10.1162/rest.2009.10174

Volume

92 (1)

Pages

179-187

Language

en

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