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The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 98 No. 5 2016

War and Relatedness

Enrico Spolaore1; Romain Wacziarg2,3

1 Tufts University · 2 National Bureau of Economic Research · 3 University of California, Los Angeles

open access

Abstract

We find that more closely related populations are more prone to engage in international conflict with each other. We provide an economic interpretation based on two connected mechanisms. First, more closely related groups share more similar preferences over rival goods and are thus more likely to fight over them. Second, rulers have stronger incentives to conquer populations more similar to their own, to minimize postconflict heterogeneity in preferences over government types and policies. We find support for these mechanisms using evidence on international conflicts over natural endowments and on territorial changes, including decolonization.

DOI
10.1162/rest_a_00554
Volume
98
Issue
5
Pages
925-939
Language
en
Sources
semanticscholar openalex crossref

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