Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts

Boris van Leeuwen; Theo Offerman; Jeroen van de Ven

doi:10.1162/rest_a_00961

Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts

Boris van Leeuwen¹; Theo Offerman²; Jeroen van de Ven³

¹ Department of Economics, Tilburg University · ² CREED, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute · ³ ASE, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2022 open access

Abstract We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.

DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00961
Volume: 104 (2)
Pages: 217-231
Language: en
Export: BibTeX
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