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Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 16 No. 2 1998

When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets

Ernst Fehr1; Erich Kirchler2; Andreas Weichbold3; Simon Gächter1

1 University of Zurich · 2 University of Vienna · 3 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)

Abstract

Do competitive markets remove the effect of social norms on market outcomes? Or are norms capable of exerting a persistent influence? In this article we report the results of a series of competitive market and bilateral bargaining experiments. They indicate that the norm of reciprocity gives rise to wages that are persistently above the competitive level. Moreover, wages under bilateral bargaining conditions coincide with wages in competitive markets, indicating that competition has a limited effect when the norm of reciprocity is operative. In addition, the results show that workers' reciprocal behavior increases effort and, hence, the efficiency of trades.

DOI
10.1086/209891
Volume
16
Issue
2
Pages
324-351
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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