Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

Josse Delfgaauw; Robert Dur; Joeri Sol; Willem Verbeke

doi:10.1086/667996

Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 31 No. 2 2013

Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

Josse Delfgaauw^1,2; Robert Dur^1,2; Joeri Sol^1,3,2; Willem Verbeke^4,2

¹ Tinbergen Institute · ² Erasmus University Rotterdam · ³ University of Amsterdam · ⁴ Environmental Research Institute of Michigan

Abstract

We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store’s manager and a sufficiently large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament.

DOI: 10.1086/667996
Volume: 31
Issue: 2
Pages: 305-326
Language: en
Sources: openalex crossref

Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

Abstract

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