Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 28 No. 2 2010
Recruitment Restrictions and Labor Markets: Evidence from the Postbellum U.S. South
Abstract
This article studies the effect of recruitment restrictions on mobility and wages in the postbellum U.S. South. I estimate the effects of criminal fines charged for “enticement” (recruiting workers already under contract) on sharecropper mobility, tenancy choice, and agricultural wages. I find that a $13 (10%) increase in the enticement fine lowered the probability of a move by black sharecroppers by 12%, daily wages by 1 cent (.1%), and the returns to experience for blacks by 0.6% per year. These results are consistent with an on‐the‐job search model, where the enticement fine raises the cost of recruiting an employed worker.
- DOI
- 10.1086/651512
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 413-445
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref