Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 24 No. 3 2006
Selective Counteroffers
Abstract
The existence of counteroffers can lead to a variety of important labor‐market features. This article develops a model of the selective use of counteroffers in which a firm decides whether to extend counteroffers after a worker informs the firm of an alternative offer. We outline factors that can influence the employer’s net value of making a counteroffer and, thus, affect the likelihood of a counteroffer. We provide a new empirical analysis that examines whether proxies for these factors do, in fact, influence the likelihood that a firm would consider a counteroffer to an employee with a competing offer.
- DOI
- 10.1086/504275
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 385-409
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref