Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 7 No. 3 1989
Compliance and Enforcement Decisions under the National Labor Relations Act
Abstract
This article analyzes the growth of regulatory litigation under the National Labor Relations Act by modeling the compliance and enforcement decisions made by the employers, unions, and workers covered by the act. An empirical analysis of the model on time-series data for 1950-80 confirms the importance of compliance and enforcement incentives in explaining the growth of unfair labor practice charges. While some actions of the National Labor Relations Board, the regulatory agency established by the act, influence these incentives and the resulting regulatory litigation, changes in some important incentives, notably relative labor costs, are beyond the board's influence.
- DOI
- 10.1086/298208
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 257-280
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref