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Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 5 No. 4, Part 2 1987

Employment Bonuses and Labor Turnover

Arthur E. Blakemore; Stuart A. Low; Michael B. Ormiston

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how a two-part compensation system composed of a rigid base salary and a flexible bonus can reduce turnover. It is shown that bonus pay is an effective retention device if it is risk reducing and is correlated with outside contract offers. For the first time, to the best of our knowledge, a model of bonus payments is tested with U.S. instead of Japanese data. The empirical results are suggestive of the conditions that give bonuses an important, even dominant, role in worker retention.

DOI
10.1086/298168
Volume
5
Issue
4, Part 2
Pages
S124-S135
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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