Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 22 No. 1 2004

An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives

Pascal Courty^1,2,3,4; Gerald Marschke⁵

¹ University of Victoria · ² Centre for Economic Policy Research · ³ London Business School · ⁴ European University Institute · ⁵ University at Albany, State University of New York

Abstract

This article studies a particular kind of gaming responses to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine whether this behavior diverts resources (e.g., agents’ time) from productive activities or whether it simply reflects an accounting phenomenon. We evaluate the efficiency impact of the behavior we identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.

DOI

10.1086/380402

Volume

22

Issue

1

Pages

23-56

Language

en

Sources

openalex crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓