Discretion and Incentives in Organizations

Trond E. Olsen; Gaute Torsvik

doi:10.1086/209963

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Discretion and Incentives in Organizations

Trond E. Olsen^1,2; Gaute Torsvik²

¹ NORCE Research AS · ² University of Bergen

Journal of Labor Economics 2000

We analyze the link between workers' discretion and incentives in an organization that lasts for several periods. In a long‐lasting affiliation, it is possible for the principal to learn and update her beliefs about essential characteristics associated with either the job or the agent. This learning possibility has an important effect on the link between workers' discretion and incentives.

DOI: 10.1086/209963
Volume: 18 (3)
Pages: 377-404
Language: en
Export: BibTeX
Sources: openalex crossref