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Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 40 No. S1 2022

Rent Sharing within Firms

David Cho1,2; Alan B. Krueger3

1 Federal Reserve · 2 Federal Reserve Board of Governors · 3 Princeton University

Abstract

This study investigates the extent to which economic rents are shared among different types of workers within firms. We utilize administrative payroll records in order to estimate the elasticity of employee compensation with respect to the price of crude oil at petroleum extraction companies. We find that the elasticity of rent sharing is heterogeneous within firms and significantly higher for workers at the top of the earnings distribution. These results can be rationalized by a bargaining model in which insiders within a firm possess greater power to negotiate over wages.

DOI
10.1086/718713
Volume
40
Issue
S1
Pages
S17-S38
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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