Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 33 No. 4 2015
Do Agents Game Their Agents’ Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers
Abstract
This paper examines how sales managers, acting as agents of the firm, game the staffing and incentives of their subordinates. Sales managers on a quota’s cusp have a unique personal incentive to retain and lower quotas for poor-performing subordinates, allowing one to isolate a manager’s interest from the firm’s. Using microdata from 244 firms that subscribe to a cloud-based service for processing sales compensation, I estimate that 13%–15% of both quota adjustments and retentions among poor performers are explained by managers’ incentives around quotas. Although a minority of poor performers are subsequently terminated or transferred, most are retained indefinitely.
- DOI
- 10.1086/681107
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 863-890
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref