Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Edwin Leuven; Hessel Oosterbeek; Joep Sonnemans; Bas van der Klaauw

doi:10.1086/659345

Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 29 No. 3 2011

Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Edwin Leuven^1,2,3,4,5,6; Hessel Oosterbeek^7,6; Joep Sonnemans^7,6; Bas van der Klaauw

¹ IZA - Institute of Labor Economics · ² Centre for Research in Engineering Surface Technology · ³ Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique · ⁴ Center for Responsible Travel · ⁵ ENSAE Paris · ⁶ University of Amsterdam · ⁷ Tinbergen Institute

open access

DOI: 10.1086/659345
Volume: 29
Issue: 3
Pages: 637-658
Language: en
Sources: semanticscholar openalex crossref

Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Cite