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Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 44 No. 1 2026

Trade Competition and the Decline in Union Organizing: Evidence from Certification Elections

Kerwin Kofi Charles1; Matthew S. Johnson2; Nagisa Tadjfar3

1 National Bureau of Economic Research · 2 Duke University · 3 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abstract

The long-term decline in US workers’ attempts to organize labor unions accelerated after 2000. We find that the swift rise of imports from China arising from a change in trade policy accounts for nearly all of this post-2000 acceleration: union certification elections decreased substantially among workers in manufacturing industries directly exposed to imports, but also among workers indirectly exposed through their local labor market. Consistent with a simple model of workers’ decision to seek union representation, direct exposure lowered the expected wage gain from unionization, whereas indirect exposure increased the cost of job loss—both of which discourage organizing.

DOI
10.1086/732302
Volume
44
Issue
1
Pages
83-117
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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