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Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 15 No. 4 1997

Voice and Loyalty as a Delegation of Authority: A Model and a Test on Matched Worker‐Firm Panels

Pierre Cahuc1,2; Francis Kramarz3,4,5,6

1 Université Paris Cité · 2 Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne · 3 Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques · 4 Centre for Research in Engineering Surface Technology · 5 Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique · 6 Center for Responsible Travel

Abstract

We model a mechanism that makes delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers profitable. Power is exchanged for loyalty. The model is tested using a matched panel of French workers and firms. For these firms, we know at two dates (1986 and 1992) whether a firm‐level agreement has been signed. Furthermore, at these two dates and for each firm, a representative sample of the employees provides information on the individuals. We show both theoretically and empirically that the voluntary signature of such an agreement induces lower employee turnover given the structure of wages.

DOI
10.1086/209841
Volume
15
Issue
4
Pages
658-688
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref

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