Econometrica Vol. 93 No. 1 2025
Persuasion Meets Delegation
Abstract
A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single‐crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature.
- DOI
- 10.3982/ecta17051
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 195-228
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref