The Design of Centralized Matching Systems on Two-Sided Platforms: Evidence from the Ride-Hailing Market

Xueli Zhang; Wei Miao; Junhong Chu; Ivan Png

doi:10.1287/mksc.2023.0561

The Design of Centralized Matching Systems on Two-Sided Platforms: Evidence from the Ride-Hailing Market

Xueli Zhang¹; Wei Miao²; Junhong Chu³; Ivan Png⁴

¹ School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian 361005, China; · ² UCL School of Management, University College London, London E14 5AA, United Kingdom; · ³ HKU Business School, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China · ⁴ NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, Singapore 119245, Singapore

Marketing Science 2026

This paper develops a dynamic structural model to investigate the tradeoff between matching efficiency and agent autonomy in the ride-hailing market.

DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2023.0561
Volume: 45 (4)
Pages: 816-843
Language: en
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