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Psychological Science Vol. 25 No. 8 2014

Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of Human Nature Reduces Retribution

Azim Shariff1; Joshua D. Greene2; Johan C. Karremans3; Jamie B. Luguri4; Connie J. Clark5; Jonathan W. Schooler6; Roy F. Baumeister7; Kathleen D. Vohs8

1 Department of Psychology, University of Oregon · 2 Department of Psychology, Harvard University · 3 Department of Social and Cultural Psychology, Behavioral Science Institute, Radboud University Nijmegen · 4 Department of Psychology, Yale University · 5 School of Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine · 6 Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara · 7 Department of Psychology, Florida State University · 8 Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota

Abstract

If free-will beliefs support attributions of moral responsibility, then reducing these beliefs should make people less retributive in their attitudes about punishment. Four studies tested this prediction using both measured and manipulated free-will beliefs. Study 1 found that people with weaker free-will beliefs endorsed less retributive, but not consequentialist, attitudes regarding punishment of criminals. Subsequent studies showed that learning about the neural bases of human behavior, through either lab-based manipulations or attendance at an undergraduate neuroscience course, reduced people's support for retributive punishment (Studies 2-4). These results illustrate that exposure to debates about free will and to scientific research on the neural basis of behavior may have consequences for attributions of moral responsibility.

DOI
10.1177/0956797614534693
Volume
25
Issue
8
Pages
1563-1570
Language
en
Sources
crossref openalex

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