Production and Operations Management 2008

Dynamic Procurement, Quantity Discounts, and Supply Chain Efficiency

Feryal Erhun¹; Pınar Keskinocak²; Sridhar Tayur³

¹ Stanford University · ² Georgia Institute of Technology · ³ Carnegie Mellon University

Abstract

We study a model with a single supplier and a single buyer who interact multiple times before the buyer sells her product in the end‐consumer market. We show that when the supplier uses a wholesale price contract, even under perfect foresight, the supplier, the buyer, and the end consumers benefit from multiple trading opportunities versus a one‐shot procurement agreement.

DOI

10.3401/poms.1080.0055

Sources

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APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓