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American Economic Review Vol. 116 No. 8 2026

Merger Effects and Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from US Consumer Packaged Goods

Vivek Bhattacharya1; Gastón Illanes1; David Stillerman2

1 Department of Economics, Northwestern University and NBER (email: ) · 2 Kogod School of Business, American University (email: )

Abstract

We document the effects of a comprehensive set of mergers of consumer packaged goods manufacturers on prices, quantities, and product assortment. Across specifications, we find a small average price effect of mergers (−0.5−1.1 percent) but substantial heterogeneity, with a standard deviation between 3.9 and 7.6 percentage points. Through a model of enforcement, we find that agencies act as if they challenge mergers they expect would increase prices more than 4.8 to 6.3 percent. Increases in stringency would reduce prices and the prevalence of completed price-increasing mergers, with minimal impacts on blocked price-decreasing mergers, at significantly greater agency burden.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20240497
Volume
116
Issue
8
Pages
2996-3035
Language
en
Sources
crossref

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