American Economic Review Vol. 116 No. 8 2026
Talent Hoarding in Organizations
Abstract
Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related pay, team size, and talent visibility. Using quasi-random exposure to talent hoarding, I show that hoarding deters internal job applications, inhibiting career progression and altering talent allocation in the firm.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.20220264
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 3110-3151
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref openalex