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American Economic Review Vol. 116 No. 8 2026

Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers

Aaron Chalfin1; Felipe Goncalves2

1 University of Pennsylvania and NBER (email: ) · 2 University of California, Los Angeles and NBER (email: )

Abstract

We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20231696
Volume
116
Issue
8
Pages
2962-2995
Language
en
Sources
crossref

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