The Cost of Regulatory Inaction: Evidence from IFRS Nonadoption
Abstract
A growing literature has examined the benefits and costs of implementing new disclosure regulations. However, little is known about the consequences when regulators fail to take action. Using IFRS adoption in 2005 as the setting, we examine the costs of regulatory inactions among non-adopting countries. We find that firms located in non-adopting countries with a higher overlap of common investors with firms in IFRS-adopting countries experience a significant decline in liquidity. Employing a within-firm-time design, we further demonstrate that analysts and institutional investors shift their attention from non-IFRS firms when other firms in their portfolios adopt IFRS. Moreover, the decline in liquidity and the associated reduction in information production by analysts and institutional investors are particularly pronounced in non-adopting countries with weak reporting enforcement actions and increasing accounting distance from IFRS standards. Overall, our findings highlight the potential costs of regulatory inaction. Valuable information production resources are diverted to the new regime, resulting in a worsened information environment for companies in the old regime.
- DOI
- 10.2308/tar-2023-0304
- Pages
- 1-31
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref openalex