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  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    This paper shows that exposure to aggregate distress risk is the underlying source of the premiums for the Fama-French size (SMB) and value (HML) factors. Using a unique data set of aggregate business failures of both private and public firms from 1926 to 1997, I build portfolios that track news about future firm failures. These tracking portfolios optimally hedge aggregate distress risk and earn a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) alpha of approximately −4% a year. Both HML and SMB predict changes in future failure rates. Small stocks have lower returns than large stocks and value stocks have lower returns than growth stocks when the market expects an increase in future failure rates. Finally, a two-factor model with the market and the tracking portfolio for aggregate distress as factors does as well as the Fama-French three-factor model in pricing the 25 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios.

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    We show that the increase in firm-specific risk in the US stock market is the result of new listings by riskier companies. In addition, our results explain why prior researchers have found that growth opportunities, profit margin, firm size, and industry composition (among other factors) are related to increases in firm-specific risk. The new listing effect is not driven by small companies becoming riskier but instead by a riskier sub-sample of the economy becoming publicly traded. These results are consistent with prior research that documents time trends in financial market development.

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    We show that idiosyncratic jumps are a key determinant of mean stock returns from both an ex post and ex ante perspective. Ex post, the entire annual average return of a typical stock accrues on the four days on which its price jumps. Ex ante, idiosyncratic jump risk earns a premium: a value-weighted weekly long-short portfolio that buys (sells) stocks with high (low) predicted jump probabilities earns annualized mean returns of 9.4% and four-factor alphas of 8.1%. This strategy’s returns are larger when there are greater limits to arbitrage. These results are consistent with investor aversion to idiosyncratic jump risk.

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) show that firms with a high probability of default have abnormally low average future returns. We show that firms with a high potential for default (death) also tend to have a relatively high probability of extremely large (jackpot) payoffs. Consistent with an investor preference for skewed, lottery-like payoffs, stocks with high predicted probabilities for jackpot returns earn abnormally low average returns. Stocks with high death or jackpot probabilities have relatively low institutional ownership and the jackpot effect we find is much stronger in stocks with high limits to arbitrage.

  • FT50 A*

    We show that a common component governs volatility dynamics across a wide range of traded equity factors. This “common factor volatility” (CFV) exists even among orthogonal factors. CFV occurs in both cash-flow and discount-rate components of factor returns and derives from market responses to fundamental news rather than underlying commonality in news volatility. Incorporating CFV improves factor volatility forecasts relative to models that include only own-factor volatility. CFV allows us to characterize stochastic discount factor (SDF) volatility dynamics in a very general sense and we show that many popular models imply SDFs with time-varying volatility that correlates strongly with CFV.

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    We examine the ability of ratings and market-based measures to predict defaults. Although market-based measures are more accurate at horizons up to one year, ratings complement market-based measures and are not redundant in predicting defaults across horizons. Market-based measures differ from ratings in that they respond to both cash-flow and discount-rate news, while ratings respond primarily to cash-flow news, which is more informative of future defaults. Ratings ignore transitory shocks to credit risk, while market-based measures do not. Rating agencies respond to transitory shocks with watches rather than downgrades. Ratings are more informative during expansions and for speculative grade firms.

Last update from database: 9/16/24, 10:02 PM (AEST)