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7 resources
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FT50 UTD24 A*
[This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor countrylevel investor protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when creditor protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak creditor protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor protections and facilitate access to external finance.]
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FT50 UTD24 A*
ABSTRACT We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, namely, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a major U.S. Exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements, and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to remove poorly performing CEOs.
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FT50 UTD24 A*
This paper exploits the staggered initiation of takeover laws across countries to examine whether the threat of takeover enhances managerial discipline. We show that following the passage of takeover laws, poorly performing firms experience more frequent takeovers; the propensity to replace poorly performing CEOs increases, especially in countries with weak investor protection; and directors of targeted firms are more likely to lose board seats following corporate-control events. Our findings suggest that the threat of takeover causes managerial discipline through the incentives that the market for corporate control provides to boards to monitor managers.
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FT50 UTD24 A*
We examine the first significant deregulation of U.S. disclosure requirements since the passage of the 1933/1934 Exchange and Securities Acts: the 2007 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 12h-6. Rule 12h-6 has made it easier for foreign firms to deregister with the SEC and thereby terminate their U.S. disclosure obligations. We show that the market reacted negatively to the announcement by the SEC that firms from countries with weak disclosure and governance regimes could more easily opt out of the stringent U.S. reporting and legal environment. We also find that since the rule's passage, an unprecedented number of firms have deregistered, and these firms often had been previous targets of U.S. class action securities lawsuits or SEC enforcement actions. Our findings suggest that shareholders of non-U.S firms place significant value on U.S. securities regulations, especially when the home country investor protections are weak.
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FT50 UTD24 A*
We test for gender bias in promotions at financial institutions using two central predictions of Becker’s (1957, 1993) model: firms with bias will (1) raise the promotion bar for marginally promoted female workers, and (2) incur costs from forgoing efficient employment practices. We find support for both of these predictions using a new nationwide panel of mortgage loan officers and their managers encompassing approximately 72,000 workers from over 1,000 shadow banks from 2014 to 2019. Overall, our findings provide evidence that gender bias is an important factor in gender gaps at financial institutions.
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FT50 UTD24 A*
Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 43 countries, we investigate whether laws and regulations as well as votes cast by U.S. institutional investors are consistent with an effective shareholder voting process. We find that laws and regulations allow for meaningful votes to be cast, as shareholder voting is both mandatory and binding for important elections. For votes cast, we find there is greater dissent voting when investors fear expropriation. Further, greater dissent voting is associated with higher director turnover and more M&A withdrawals. Our results suggest that shareholder voting is an effective mechanism for exercising governance around the world.
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FT50 UTD24 A*
ABSTRACT This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.
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