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Pasquariello, P. (2014). Financial Market Dislocations. The Review of Financial Studies, 27, 1868–1914.

FT50 UTD24 A*

Dislocations occur when financial markets, operating under stressful conditions, experience large, widespread asset mispricings. This study documents systematic dislocations in world capital markets and the importance of their fluctuations for expected asset returns. Our novel, model-free measure of these dislocations is a monthly average of hundreds of individual abnormal absolute violations of three textbook arbitrage parities in stock, foreign exchange, and money markets. We find that investors demand statistically and economically significant risk premiums to hold financial assets performing poorly during market dislocations, that is, when both frictions to the trading activity of speculators and arbitrageurs and their marginal utility of wealth are likely to be high.

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Pasquariello, P. (2018). Government Intervention and Arbitrage. The Review of Financial Studies, 31, 3344–3408.

FT50 UTD24 A*

Direct government intervention in a market may induce violations of the law of one price in other, arbitrage-related markets. I show that a government pursuing a nonpublic, partially informative price target in a model of strategic market-order trading and segmented dealership generates equilibrium price differentials among fundamentally identical assets by clouding dealers’ inference about the targeted asset’s payoff from its order flow, to an extent complexly dependent on existing price formation. I find supportive evidence using a sample of American Depositary Receipts and other cross-listings traded in the major U.S. exchanges, along with currency interventions by developed and emerging countries between 1980 and 2009.Received May 18, 2016; editorial decision May 10, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

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Pasquariello, P. (2007). Imperfect Competition, Information Heterogeneity, and Financial Contagion. The Review of Financial Studies, 20, 391–426. JSTOR.

FT50 UTD24 A*

[This study examines how heterogeneity of private information may induce financial contagion. Using a model of multi-asset trading in which the three main channels of contagion through financial linkages in the literature (correlated information, correlated liquidity, and portfolio rebalancing) are ruled out by construction, I show that financial contagion can still be an equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneous fundamental information. Risk-neutral speculators trade strategically across many assets to mask their information advantage about one asset. Asymmetric sharing of information among them prevents rational market makers from learning about their individual signals and trades with sufficient accuracy. Incorrect cross-inference about terminal payoffs and contagion ensue. When used to analyze the transmission of shocks across countries, my model suggests that the process of generation and disclosure of information in emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financial contagion.]

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Pasquariello, P., & Vega, C. (2007). Informed and Strategic Order Flow in the Bond Markets. The Review of Financial Studies, 20, 1975–2019. JSTOR.

FT50 UTD24 A*

[We study the role played by private and public information in the process of price formation in the U.S. Treasury bond market. To guide our analysis, we develop a parsimonious model of speculative trading in the presence of two realistic market frictions-information heterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed traders-and a public signal. We test its equilibrium implications by analyzing the response of two-year, five-year, and ten-year U.S. bond yields to order flow and real-time U.S. macroeconomic news. We find strong evidence of informational effects in the U.S. Treasury bond market: unanticipated order flow has a significant and permanent impact on daily bond yield changes during both announcement and nonannouncement days. Our analysis further shows that, consistent with our stylized model, the contemporaneous correlation between order flow and yield changes is higher when the dispersion of beliefs among market participants is high and public announcements are noisy.]

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Pasquariello, P., & Wang, Y. (2024). Speculation with Information Disclosure. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 59, 956–1002.

FT50 A* Open Access

Sophisticated investors frequently choose to publicly disclose private information, a phenomenon inconsistent with most theories of speculation. We propose and test a model to bridge this gap. We show that when a speculator cares about both short-term portfolio value and long-term profit, a disclosure mixing asset fundamentals and her holdings is optimal by inducing competitive dealership to revise prices toward those holdings while alleviating adverse selection. We find that when mutual fund managers have stronger short-term incentives, the frequency of strategic non-anonymous disclosures about their stocks by market-worthy newspaper articles increases and those stocks’ liquidity improves, consistent with our model.

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Pasquariello, P., & Vega, C. (2009). The on-the-run liquidity phenomenon. Journal of Financial Economics, 92, 1–24.

FT50 UTD24 A*

We test the implications of a model of multi-asset speculative trading in which liquidity differentials between on-the-run and off-the-run U.S. Treasury bonds ensue from endowment shocks in the presence of two realistic market frictions—information heterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed traders—and a public signal. Our evidence suggests that (i) off/on-the-run liquidity differentials are economically and statistically significant, even after controlling for several of the bonds’ intrinsic characteristics (such as duration, convexity, repo rates, or term premiums), and (ii) off/on-the-run liquidity differentials are smaller immediately following bond auction dates, and larger when the uncertainty surrounding the ensuing auction allocations is high, when the dispersion of beliefs across informed traders is high, and when macroeconomic announcements are noisy, consistent with our model.

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Bharath, S. T., Pasquariello, P., & Wu, G. (2009). Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions? The Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3211–3243. JSTOR.

FT50 UTD24 A*

[Using a novel information asymmetry index based on measures of adverse selection developed by the market microstructure literature, we test whether information asymmetry is an important determinant of capital structure decisions, as suggested by the pecking order theory. Our index relies exclusively on measures of the market's assessment of adverse selection risk rather than on ex ante firm characteristics. We find that information asymmetry does affect the capital structure decisions of U. S. firms over the sample period 1973-2002. Our findings are robust to controlling for conventional leverage factors (size, tangibility, Q ratio, profitability), the sources of firms' financing needs, and such firm attributes as stock return volatility, stock turnover, and intensity of insider trading. For example, we estimate that on average, for every dollar of financing deficit to cover, firms in the highest adverse selection decile issue 30 cents of debt more than firms in the lowest decile. Overall, this evidence explains why the pecking order theory is only partially successful in explaining all of firms' capital structure decisions. It also suggests that the theory finds support when its basic assumptions hold in the data, as should reasonably be expected of any theory.]

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