Your search

× We're adding references and refining topic classifications. The platform is under construction, and we're looking for maintainers to help. Interested in contributing? Get in touch!
In authors or contributors
  • FT50 A*

    We propose a method to estimate the effect of firm policies (e.g., bankruptcy laws) on allocative efficiency using (quasi-)experimental evidence. Our approach takes general equilibrium effects into account and requires neither a structural estimation nor a precise assumption on how the experiment affects firms. Our aggregation formula relies on treatment effects of the policy on the distribution of output-to-capital ratios, which are easily estimated. We show this method is valid for a large class of commonly used models in macrofinance. We apply it to the French banking deregulation episode of the mid-1980s and find an increase in aggregate TFP of 5 percent.

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    [Optimistic beliefs are a source of nonpecuniary benefits for entrepreneurs that can explain the "Private Equity Puzzle." This paper looks at the effects of entrepreneurial optimism on financial contracting. When the contract space is restricted to debt, we show the existence of a separating equilibrium in which optimists self-select into short-term debt and realists into long-term debt. Long-term debt is optimal for a realist entrepreneur as it smooths payoffs across states of nature. Short-term debt is optimal for optimists for two reasons: (i) "bridging the gap in beliefs" by letting the entrepreneur take a bet on his project's success, and (ii) letting the investor impose adaptation decisions in bad states. We test our theory on a large data set of French entrepreneurs. First, in agreement with the psychology literature, we find that biases in beliefs may be (partly) explained by individual characteristics and tend to persist over time. Second, as predicted by our model, we find that short-term debt is robustly correlated with "optimistic" expectation errors, even controlling for firm risk and other potential determinants of short-term leverage.]

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    Limits to arbitrage arise because financial intermediaries may face funding constraints when mispricing worsens. Using a model with limits to arbitrage, where we allow arbitrageurs to secure capital even in case of underperformance, we show that arbitrageurs that are more protected from withdrawals have more mean-reverting and volatile returns. Using data on hedge fund performance, we find robust support for these hypotheses: Funds with contractual impediments to withdrawals, and funds with performance-insensitive outflows, recover more quickly after a bad year and have more volatile returns. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that some hedge funds overcome the limits to arbitrage.

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    We study the relation between the ownership structure of financial assets and non-fundamental risk. We define an asset to be fragile if it is susceptible to non-fundamental shifts in demand. An asset can be fragile because of concentrated ownership, or because its owners face correlated or volatile liquidity shocks, i.e., they must buy or sell at the same time. We formalize this idea and apply it to mutual fund ownership of US stocks. Consistent with our predictions, fragility strongly predicts price volatility. We then extend the logic of fragility to investigate two natural extensions: (1) the forecast of stock return comovement and (2) the potentially destabilizing impact of arbitrageurs on stock prices.

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    The correlation in house price growth across US states increased steadily between 1976 and 2000. This paper shows that the contemporaneous geographic integration of the US banking market, via the emergence of large banks, was a primary driver of this phenomenon. To this end, we first theoretically derive an appropriate measure of banking integration across state pairs and show that house price growth correlation is strongly related to this measure of financial integration. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that banking integration can explain up to one-fourth of the rise in house price correlation over this period.

  • FT50 UTD24 A*

    Using a data set of 839 French deals, we look at the change in corporate behavior following a leveraged buyout (LBO) relative to an adequately chosen control group. In the 3 years following a leveraged buyout, targets become more profitable, grow much faster than their peer group, issue additional debt, and increase capital expenditures. We then provide evidence consistent with the idea that in our sample, private equity funds create value by relaxing credit constraints, allowing LBO targets to take advantage of hitherto unexploited growth opportunities. First, post-buyout growth is concentrated among private-to-private transactions, i.e., deals where the seller is an individual, as opposed to divisional buyouts or public-to-private LBOs where the seller is a private or a public firm. Second, the observed post-buyout growth in size and post-buyout increase in debt and capital expenditures are stronger when the targets operate in an industry that is relatively more dependent on external finance. These results contrast with existing evidence that LBO targets invest less or downsize.

Last update from database: 9/16/24, 10:02 PM (AEST)