A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 263 resources
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Executives can only impact firm outcomes if they have influence over crucial decisions. On the basis of this idea, we develop and test the hypothesis that firms whose CEOs have more decision-making power should experience more variability in performance. Focusing primarily on the power the CEO has over the board and other top executives as a consequence of his formal position and titles, status as a founder, and status as the board's sole insider, we find that stock returns are more variable for firms run by powerful CEOs. Our findings suggest that the interaction between executive characteristics and organizational variables has important consequences for firm performance. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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We analyze the consequences of the board's dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade‐off in disclosing information to the board: If he reveals his information, he receives better advice; however, an informed board will also monitor him more intensively. Since an independent board is a tougher monitor, the CEO may be reluctant to share information with it. Thus, management‐friendly boards can be optimal. Using the insights from the model, we analyze the differences between sole and dual board systems. We highlight several policy implications of our analysis.
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What makes a successful CEO? We combine a near-exhaustive sample of male CEOs from Swedish companies with data on their cognitive and noncognitive ability and height at age 18. CEOs differ from other high-skill professions most in noncognitive ability. The median large-company CEO belongs to the top 5% of the population in the combination of the three traits. The traits have a monotonic and close to linear relation with CEO pay, but their correlations with pay, firm size, and CEO fixed effects in firm policies are relatively low. Traits appear necessary but not sufficient for making it to the top.
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We show that top management incentives vary by responsibility. For oversight executives, pay‐performance incentives are 1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than for divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are 5.65 higher than for divisional executives. Incentives for the median top management team are substantial at $32.32. CEOs account for 42 to 58 percent of aggregate team incentives. For divisional executives, the pay–divisional performance sensitivity is positive and increasing in the precision of divisional performance and the pay–firm performance sensitivity is decreasing in the precision of divisional performance. These results support principal–agent models with multiple signals of managerial effort.
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We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003-2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.
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We develop a unified theory of dynamic contracting and assortative matching to explain firm dynamics. In our model, neither firms nor managers can commit to arrangements that yield lower payoffs than their outside options, which are microfounded by the equilibrium conditions in a matching market. The model endogenously generates power laws in firm size and CEO compensation, and explains differences in their right tails. We also show that our model quantitatively accounts for many salient features of the time‐series dynamics and the cross‐sectional distribution of firm investment, dividend payout, and CEO compensation.
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We extend the neoclassical investment model (Hayashi, 1982) to allow for limited commitment on compensation contracts. We consider three types of limited commitment: (i) managers cannot commit to compensation contracts that provide lower continuation utility than their outside options; (ii) shareholders cannot commit to negative net present value (NPV) projects; (iii) both the managers and the shareholders cannot commit. We characterize the optimal contract under general convex adjustment cost functions and provide examples for which closed-form solutions can be obtained. We show that, as in the data, small firms invest more, grow faster, and have a higher Tobin׳s Q than large firms under the optimal contract. In addition, the pattern of the dependence of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation on past performance implied by our model is also consistent with empirical evidence.
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Change of management restrictions (CMRs) in loan contracts give lenders explicit ex ante control rights over managerial retention and selection. This paper shows that lenders use CMRs to mitigate risks arising from CEO turnover, especially those related to the loss of human capital and replacement uncertainty, thereby providing evidence that human capital risk affects debt contracting. With a CMR in place, the likelihood of CEO turnover decreases by more than half, and future firm performance improves when retention frictions are important, suggesting that lenders can influence managerial turnover, even outside of default states, and help the borrower retain talent.
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Knowledge gleaned from previous acquisitions may confer valuation expertise and other benefits. But numerous acquisitions also entail costs, due to problems of incorporating diverse units into an ever larger firm. Such benefits and costs are not directly observable from outside the firm. This article proposes a simple model to infer their relative importance, using the time between successive deals. The data requirements are minimal and allow the use of all mergers and acquisitions during 1992–2009 (more than 300,000 deals). The results provide evidence of learning gains through repetitive acquisitions, especially under CEO continuity and when successive deals are more similar.
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Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.
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