A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 436 resources
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This paper presents a theory of establishment size dynamics based on the accumulationof industry-specific human capital that simultaneously rationalizes the economy-wide facts on establishment growth rates, exit rates, and size distributions. Thetheory predicts that establishment growth and net exit rates should decline fasterwith size, and that the establishment size distribution should have thinner tails, insectors that use specific human capital less intensively. We establish that there issubstantial cross-sector heterogeneity in US establishment size dynamics and distributions,which is well explained by relative factor intensities. (JEL L11 , L16, L25).
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It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance maymake all agents better off in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets.We find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks, compulsoryinsurance makes low-risk agents worse off. Hence, behavioral biases may weaken some of thewell-established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information. (JEL D82, G22)
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We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (a) goods arehomogenous and firms compete in quantities; (b) new, noisy information arrivescontinuously, without sudden events; and (c) firms are able to respond to newinformation quickly. The result holds even if we allow for asymmetric equilibriaor monetary transfers. The intuition is that the flexibility to respond quickly to newinformation unravels any collusive scheme. Our result applies to both a simple stationarymodel and a more complicated one, with prices following a mean-revertingMarkov process, as well as to models of dynamic cooperation in many other settings.(JEL D43, L12, L13)
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In developing countries lacking legal enforcement, villagers may use implicit contractsto minimize crime. I construct a dynamic limited-commitment model, in whicha thief cannot commit to forego stealing, but is induced to steal less by the promise offuture gifts. Combining survey data on production, theft, gifts, and trust with experimentsmeasuring trustworthiness, I provide supporting evidence. Farmers living nearmore relatives or with plots that are difficult to steal from give fewer gifts and trustmore, and those living near more relatives also experience less theft. Giving increaseswhen trust is lower and the threat of theft is greater. (JEL D86, K42, O17, Z13)
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We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation.Antitrust policies that restrict incumbent behavior toward new entrants may haveconflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, butlowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effectcan be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply, holding theinnovation rate fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrustpolicies. We also show that, in some cases, the tension does not arise, and policiesthat protect entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation. (JEL K21, L13, L14,L40, O30)
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Preferences for redistribution, as well as the generosity of welfare states, differ significantly across countries. This paper tests whether there exists a feedback process of the economic regime on individual preferences. We exploit the experiment of German separation and reunification to establish exogeneity of the economic system. We find that, after German reunification, East Germans are more in favor of state intervention than West Germans. This effect is especially strong for older cohorts. We further find that East Germans' preferences converge toward those of West Germans. It will take one to two generations for preferences to converge completely. (JEL D12, D72, H11, H23, P26)
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Economists have recently argued recessions play a useful role in fostering growth.Yet a major source of growth, R&D, is procyclical. This paper argues one reasonfor procyclical R&D is a dynamic externality inherent in R&D that makes entrepreneursshort-sighted and concentrate their innovation in booms, even when it isoptimal to concentrate it in recessions. Additional forces may imply that procyclicalR&D is desirable, but equilibrium R&D is likely to be too procyclical, and macroeconomicshocks are likely to have overly persistent effects on output and makegrowth more costly than in the absence of such shocks.
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Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are muchmore susceptible to the winner's curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACTscores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperiencedand experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders whohave lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects. Theseselection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques butare identified through experimental treatment effects. Ignoring these selectioneffects leads to misleading estimates of learning. (JEL D44, D83, J16)
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People who are members of a group and identify with it behave differently from peoplewho perceive themselves as isolated individuals. This paper shows that groupmembership affects preferences over outcomes, and saliency of the group affects theperception of the environment. We manipulate the saliency of group membershipby letting a player's own group watch as a passive audience as decisions are made,and/or by making part of the payoff common for members of the group. In contrastto the minimal-group paradigm, minimal groups alone do not affect behavior in ourstrategic environments. However, salient group membership significantly increasesthe aggressive stance of the hosts (people who have their group members in theaudience), and tends to reduce that of the guests. (JEL D71, Z13)
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Journals
- American Economic Review (192)
- Journal of Finance (84)
- Journal of Financial Economics (103)
- Review of Financial Studies (57)
Topic
- Bond (23)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (7)
- CEO (7)
- Director (1)
- Capital Structure (1)
Resource type
- Journal Article (436)