A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 436 resources
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We present a model where trade agreements are motivated by the desire of governments to commit vis-à-vis domestic lobbies, in addition to standard terms-of-tradeexternalities. The model predicts that trade liberalization is deeper when capital is more mobile across sectors, and when governments are more politically motivated (provided domestic-commitment motives are strong enough). The model also provides a new rationale for the use of tariff ceilings. In a fully dynamic specification of the model, tariffs are reduced in two stages: an immediate cut and a subsequent gradual reduction, with the speed of liberalization increasing in the degree of capitalmobility. (JEL D72, F13)
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What role does labor play in firms' market value? We use a production-based asset pricing model with factor adjustment costs and forward-looking agents to explore this question. We posit that the hiring of labor is akin to investment in capital and that the two interact, with the interaction being a crucial determinant of the dynamic behavior of market value. Using aggregate US corporate sector data, we estimate firms' optimal hiring and investment decisions and the consequences for firms' value. (JEL E22, E24, G31, G32, M51)
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We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms' ability to colludewhen selling to downstream firms in a repeated game. We show that vertical mergersgive rise to an outlets effect: the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firmsare reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliatesof their integrated rivals. Vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect: integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phasethan unintegrated upstream firms. The net result of these effects in an unintegratedindustry is to facilitate upstream collusion. We provide conditions under which furthervertical integration also facilitates collusion. (JEL D43, G34, L12, L13)
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Systematic asymmetries in exchange behavior have been widely interpreted as support for "endowment effect theory," an application of prospect theory positing that loss aversion and utility function kinks set by entitlements explain observed asymmetries. We experimentally test an alternative explanation, namely, that asymmetries are explained by classical preference theories finding influence through the experimental procedures typically used. Contrary to the predictions of endowment effect theory, we observe no asymmetries when we modify procedures to remove the influence of classical preference theories. When we return to traditional-type procedures, however, the asymmetries reappear. The results support explanations based in classical preference theories and reject endowment effect theory. (JEL D01)
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This paper develops a dynamic model of mismatch. Workers and jobs are randomlyallocated to labor markets. Each market clears, but some have excess (unemployed)workers and some have excess (vacant) jobs. As workers and jobs switch markets,unemployed workers find vacancies and employed workers become unemployed.The model is quantitatively consistent with the business cycle frequency comovementof unemployment, vacancies, and the job finding rate and explains much ofthese variables' volatility. It can also address cyclicality in the separation rate intounemployment and duration dependence in the job finding rate. The results arerobust to some nonrandom mobility. (JEL E24, J41, J63, J64)
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Previous papers by Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Jr.(1991) and Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2000) argue that exclusive contractscan inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and multiplebuyers. We first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are finalconsumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages. We thenshow, however, that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers aredownstream competitors, even in the absence of scale economies and even if breachis possible. (JEL D86, K21, L11 , L13, L14, L40)
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In textbook expositions of the equity-premium, riskfree-rate and equity-volatilitypuzzles, agents are sure of the economy's structure while growth rates are normallydistributed. But because of parameter uncertainty the thin-tailed normaldistribution conditioned on realized data becomes a thick-tailed Student-t distribution,which changes the entire nature of what is considered "puzzling" by reversingevery inequality discrepancy needing to be explained. This paper shows thatBayesian updating of unknown structural parameters inevitably adds a permanenttail-thickeningeffect to posterior expectations. The expected-utility ramifications ofthis for asset pricing are strong, work against the puzzles, and are very sensitive tosubjective prior beliefs—even with asymptotically infinite data. (JEL D84, G12)
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We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship betweencontractual incompleteness, technological complementarities, and technology adoption.In our model, a firm chooses its technology and investment levels in contractibleactivities by suppliers of intermediate inputs. Suppliers then choose investmentsin noncontractible activities, anticipating payoffs from an ex post bargaining game.We show that greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of lessadvanced technologies, and that the impact of contractual incompleteness is morepronounced when there is greater complementary among the intermediate inputs.We study a number of applications of the main framework and show that themechanism proposed in the paper can generate sizable productivity differencesacross countries with different contracting institutions, and that differences incontracting institutions lead to endogenous comparative advantage differences.(JEL D86, O33)
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To identify the important tradeoffs in consulting a single expert for both diagnosis and treatment, we examine the costs and health outcomes of elderly Medicare beneficiaries with coronary artery disease. We compare the empirical consequences of diagnosis by cardiologists who can provide surgical treatment – "integrated" cardiologists – to the consequences of diagnosis by a nonintegrated cardiologist. Diagnosis by an integrated cardiologist leads, on net, to higher health spending but similar health outcomes. The net effect contains three components: reduced spending and improved outcomes from better allocation of patients to surgical treatment options; increased spending conditional on treatment option; and worse outcomes from poorer provision of nonsurgical care. (JEL I11, I18)
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We develop a survey instrument to measure self-control problems in a sample of highly educated adults. This measure relates in the manner that theory predicts to liquid wealth accumulation and personality measures. Yet while self-control problems are typically seen as resulting in overconsumption and low wealth, we identify a significant group who underconsume and thereby accumulate high levels of wealth. In addition, self-control problems are smaller in scale for older than for younger respondents. Those who put money aside in retirement accounts may be delaying access to a point at which self-control problems are no longer important. (JEL D12, D14)
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Journals
- American Economic Review (192)
- Journal of Finance (84)
- Journal of Financial Economics (103)
- Review of Financial Studies (57)
Topic
- Bond (23)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (7)
- CEO (7)
- Director (1)
- Capital Structure (1)
Resource type
- Journal Article (436)