A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 536 resources
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The acceleration of the U.S. productivity growth in the late 1990s suggests a significant advance in technological innovation, making the perceived probability of entering a “new economy” ever increasing. Based on macroeconomic data, we identify a Bayesian investor's belief evolution when facing a possible structural break in the economy. We show that such belief evolution plays a significant role in explaining both the stock market boom and crash during 1998 to 2001. We conclude that a rational investor's uncertainty about the future of the U.S. economy provides an alternative explanation for the late 1990s stock market “bubble.”
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This comment addresses a point raised in Russell Cooper and Jonathan Willis (2003, 2004), which discusses whether the "gap approach" is appropriate to describe the adjustment of production factors. They show that this approach to labor adjustment as applied in Ricardo J. Caballero, Eduardo Engel, and John C. Haltiwanger (1997) and Caballero and Engel (1993) can falsely generate evidence in favor of nonconvex adjustment costs, even if costs are quadratic. Simulating a dynamic model of firm-level employment decisions with quadratic adjustment costs and estimating a gap model from the simulated data, they identify two factors producing this spurious evidence: approximating dynamic adjustment targets by static ones, and estimating the static targets themselves. This comment reassesses whether the first factor indeed leads to spurious evidence in favor of fixed adjustment costs. We show that the numerical approximation of the productivity process is pivotal for Cooper and Willis's finding. With more precise approximations of the productivity process, it becomes rare to falsely reject the quadratic adjustment cost model due to the approximation of dynamic targets by static ones. (JEL E24, J3)
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This note responds to Christian Bayer (2009). Cooper and Willis (2004), hereafter CW, find the aggregate nonlinearities reported in Ricardo Caballero and Eduardo Engel (1993) and Caballero, Engel, and John Haltiwanger (1997) reflect mismeasurement of theemployment gap, not nonlinearities in plant-level adjustment. Bayer concludes the CW result is not robust to alternative aggregate shock processes. We concur, but argue that the nonlinearity created by mismeasurement does not disappear. Instead, it is directly related to the level of the aggregate shock. The CW findings are robust for the natural case of unobserved gaps. (JEL E24, J23)
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This paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, symmetrically informed liquidity traders dynamically choose between limit and market orders, trading off execution price and waiting costs. In equilibrium, the bid and ask prices depend only on the numbers of buy and sell orders in the book. The model has a number of empirical predictions: (i) higher trading activity and higher trading competition cause smaller spreads and lower price impact; (ii) market orders lead to a temporary price impact larger than the permanent price impact, therefore to price overshooting; (iii) buy and sell orders can cluster away from the bid-ask spread, generating a hump-shaped order book; (iv) bid and ask prices display a comovement effect: after, e.g., a sell market order moves the bid price down, the ask price also falls, by a smaller amount, so the bid-ask spread widens; (v) when the order book is full, traders may submit quick, or fleeting, limit orders.
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We develop a tractable and flexible stochastic volatility multifactor model of the term structure of interest rates. It features unspanned stochastic volatility factors, correlation between innovations to forward rates and their volatilities, quasi-analytical prices of zero-coupon bond options, and dynamics of the forward rate curve, under both the actual and risk-neutral measures, in terms of a finite-dimensional affine state vector. The model has a very good fit to an extensive panel dataset of interest rates, swaptions, and caps. In particular, the model matches the implied cap skews and the dynamics of implied volatilities.
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This paper develops a rational, liquidity-based model of closed-end funds (CEFs) that provides an economic motivation for the existence of this organizational form: They offer a means for investors to buy illiquid securities, without facing the potential costs associated with direct trading and without the externalities imposed by an open-end fund structure. Our theory predicts the patterns observed in CEF initial public offerings (IPOs) and the observed behavior of the CEF discount, which results from a trade-off between the liquidity benefits of investing in the CEF and the fees charged by the fund's managers. In particular, the model explains why IPOs occur in waves in certain sectors at a time, why funds are issued at a premium to net asset value (NAV), and why they later usually trade at a discount. We also conduct an empirical investigation, which, overall, provides more support for a liquidity-based model than for an alternative sentiment-based explanation.
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Limit order markets with stationary dynamics attract equal volumes of market orders and uncanceled limit orders, equalizing the supply and demand for liquidity and immediacy. To maintain this balance, market orders must share any benefit obtained by limit order traders from more efficient trading conditions, such as better order queuing policies. Therefore an efficient market places a low price on immediacy, producing small bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, when price-discreteness leads to a mainly constant spread, cutting the price tick raises surplus. This is modeled with a stochastic sequential game, using stationarity considerations to bypass direct analysis of traders' intricate market forecasts.
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This paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium, by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO's utility and production functions, we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models. First, both the CEO's low fractional ownership (the Jensen–Murphy incentives measure) and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting, and thus need not reflect rent extraction. Second, the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value, divided by annual pay, is independent of firm size, and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives. Third, incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value, such as strategy choice. However, additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring.
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Journals
- American Economic Review (217)
- Journal of Finance (79)
- Journal of Financial Economics (93)
- Review of Financial Studies (147)
Topic
- Bond (26)
- CEO (14)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (9)
- Director (8)
- Capital Structure (4)
Resource type
- Journal Article (536)