A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 526 resources
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A large empirical literature finds that there is too little international tradeand too much intranational trade to be rationalized by observed internationaltrade costs, such as tariffs and transport costs. This paper investigates whethera model in which the nature of production can change in response to tradecosts – a framework with multistage production – can better explain the homebias in trade. The calibrated model can explain about two-fifths of the Canadaborder effect, about two-and-one-half times that of a model with one productionstage. The model also explains a significant fraction of Canada-US "back-and-forth," or vertical specialization, trade. (JEL F11, F13, F14)
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This study examines the association between chief financial officer (CFO) equity incentives and earnings management. Chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives have been shown to be associated with accruals management and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Because CFOs' primary responsibility is financial reporting, CFO equity incentives should play a stronger role than those of the CEO in earnings management. We find that the magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to those of the CEO. Our evidence supports the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) new disclosure requirement on CFO compensation.
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In this article, we derive an analytic expression for the representative agent of a large class of economies populated by agents with "catching up with the Joneses" preferences, but who exhibit heterogeneous risk aversion. As Chan and Kogan (2002) show numerically, the representative agent has stochastic risk that moves countercyclically to the state variable. However, we show that heterogeneity of risk aversion alone is insufficient for explaining empirical regularities–namely the variability of the Sharpe ratio–that Campbell and Cochrane (1999) obtain in a model of a representative agent with stochastic risk aversion.
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This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of bond markets in which two groups of agents hold heterogeneous expectations about future economic conditions. The heterogeneous expectations cause agents to take on speculative positions against each other and therefore generate endogenous relative wealth fluctuation. The relative wealth fluctuation amplifies asset price volatility and contributes to the time variation in bond premia. Our model shows that a modest amount of heterogeneous expectations can help explain several puzzling phenomena, including the "excessive volatility" of bond yields, the failure of the expectations hypothesis, and the ability of a tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates to predict bond returns.
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The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-lookingmodel, when the central bank recognizes that private sector expectationsneed not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that willbe as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency.It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimalpolicy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree ofpotential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-dependentthan if rational expectations are assumed. (JEL C62, D84, E13, E31,E32, E52)
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I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole(2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effect of price regulation and mergers. (JEL D42, D85, L14)
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The paper presents a meta dataset covering 13 experiments on social learning games. It is found that in situations where it is empirically optimal to follow others and contradict one's own information, the players err in the majority of cases, forgoing substantial parts of earnings. The average player contradicts her own signal only if the empirical odds ratio of the own signal being wrong, conditional on all available information, is larger than 2:1, rather than 1:1 as would be implied by rational expectations. A regression analysis formulates a straightforward test of rational expectations which strongly rejects the null. (JEL D82, D83, D84)
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I develop a novel view of the trade frictions between rich and poor countries by arguing that to reconcile bilateral trade volumes and price data within a standard gravity model, the trade frictions between rich and poor countries must be systematically asymmetric, with poor countries facing higher costs to export relative to rich countries. I provide a method to model these asymmetries and demonstrate the merits of my approach relative to alternatives in the trade literature. I then argue that these trade frictions are quantitatively important to understanding the large differences in standards of living and total factor productivity across countries. (JEL F11, F13, F14, O19 )
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Journals
- American Economic Review (236)
- Journal of Finance (69)
- Journal of Financial Economics (101)
- Review of Financial Studies (120)
Topic
- Bond (28)
- CEO (15)
- Director (13)
- Capital Structure (9)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (8)
Resource type
- Journal Article (526)