A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 536 resources
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Using a large dataset on web browsing and purchasing behavior we test to what extent consumers are searching in accordance to various search models. We find that the benchmark model of sequential search with a known price distribution can be rejected based on recall patterns found in the data as well as the absence of dependence of search decisions on prices. Our findings suggest fixed sample size search provides a more accurate description of search behavior. We then utilize the fixed sample size search model to estimate demand elasticities of online bookstores in an environment where store preferences are heterogeneous. (JEL D12, D83, L81)
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I use bilateral import data to test for and quantify the importance of trade costs and asset market frictions in explaining the failure of perfect international consumption risk sharing. I find that while frictions in international asset markets significantly impede optimal consumption risk sharing between developed and developing countries over the period 1970-2000, developed countries are close to optimal risk sharing with each other. Trade costs, in contrast, significantly impede risk sharing for all countries. (JEL E21, E44, F14, F41, G15)
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We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender's ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard. (JEL D14, D82, G21, O12, O16)
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Motivated by the evidence that risk premia are large and countercyclical, this paper studies a tractable real business cycle model with a small risk of economic disaster, such as the Great Depression. An increase in disaster risk leads to a decline of employment, output, investment, stock prices, and interest rates, and an increase in the expected return on risky assets. The model matches well data on quantities, asset prices, and particularly the relations between quantities and prices, suggesting that variation in aggregate risk plays a significant role in some business cycles. (JEL E13, E32, E44, G32)
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I examine physician agency in health care services in the context of the choice between brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals. I examine micro-panel data from Japan, where physicians can legally make profits by prescribing and dispensing drugs. The results indicate that physicians often fail to internalize patient costs, explaining why cheaper generics are infrequently adopted. Doctors respond to markup differentials between the two versions, indicating another agency problem. However, generics' markup advantages are shortlived, which limits their impact on increasing generic adoption. Additionally, state dependence and heterogeneous doctor preferences affected generics' adoption. Policy makers can target these factors to improve static efficiency. (JEL D82, I11, J44, L65)
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Under Medicare Part D, senior citizens choose prescription drug insurance offered by numerous private insurers. We examine nonpoor enrollees- actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data. Our sample reduced overspending by $298 on average, with gains by 81 percent of them. The greatest improvements were by those who overspent most in 2006 and by those who switched plans. Decisions to switch depended on individuals' overspending in 2006 and on individual-specific effects of changes in their current plans. The oldest consumers and those initiating medications for Alzheimer's disease improved by more than average, suggesting that real-world institutions help overcome cognitive limitations. (JEL D14, G22, H51, I13, I18)
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We develop a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles in which changes in investor sentiment lead to the appearance and collapse of macroeconomic bubbles or pyramid schemes. These bubbles mitigate the effects of financial frictions. During bubbly episodes, unproductive investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. These transfers of resources improve economic efficiency thereby expanding consumption, the capital stock and output. When bubbly episodes end, there is a fall in consumption, the capital stock and output. We argue that the stochastic equilibria of the model provide a natural way of introducing bubble shocks into business cycle models. (JEL E22, E23, E32, E44, O41)
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We document a negative correlation, at business cycle frequencies, between the net job creation rate of large employers and the level of aggregate unemployment that is much stronger than for small employers. The differential growth rate of employment between initially large and small employers has an unconditional correlation of -0.5 with the unemployment rate, and varies by about 5 percent over the business cycle. We exploit several datasets from the United States, Denmark, and France, both repeated cross sections and job flows with employer longitudinal information, spanning the last four decades and several business cycles. We discuss implications for theories of factor demand. (JEL D22, E23, E32, J23, L25)
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Bayes' rule has two well-known limitations: 1) it does not model the reaction to zero-probability events; 2) a sizable empirical evidence documents systematic violations of it. We characterize axiomatically an alternative updating rule, the Hypothesis Testing model. According to it, the agent follows Bayes' rule if she receives information to which she assigned a probability above a threshold. Otherwise, she looks at a prior over priors, updates it using Bayes' rule for second-order priors, and chooses the prior to which the updated prior over priors assigns the highest likelihood. We also present an application to equilibrium refinement in game theory. (JEL D11, D81, D83)
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Suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a monitor to detect their deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? To address this question, I propose a contract that makes the monitor responsible for monitoring, and thereby provides incentives even when the monitor's observations are not only private, but costly, too. I also characterize exactly when such a contract can provide monitors with the right incentives to perform. In doing so, I emphasize virtual enforcement and suggest its implications for the theory of repeated games. (JEL C78, D23, D82, D86)
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Journals
- American Economic Review (256)
- Journal of Finance (60)
- Journal of Financial Economics (124)
- Review of Financial Studies (96)
Topic
- Bond (21)
- CEO (12)
- Capital Structure (9)
- Director (8)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (4)
Resource type
- Journal Article (536)