A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 536 resources
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Immediately following a minimum wage hike, household incomerises on average by about 250 per quarter and spending by roughly700 per quarter for households with minimum wage workers. Mostof the spending response is caused by a small number of householdswho purchase vehicles. Furthermore, we find that the high spendinglevels are financed through increases in collateralized debt. Ourresults are consistent with a model where households can borrowagainst durables and face costs of adjusting their durables stock.(JEL D12, D14, D91, J38)
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This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitelyrepeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoringenvironment, increasing the severity of the potential punishmentmonotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realisticimperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship.Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing. (JEL C92, H41, K42)
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Experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than whatseems reasonable for economic decision-making. Such high rates areoften attributed to present-biased discounting. A well-known bias ofstandard measurements is the assumption of linear consumption utility. Attempting to correct this bias using measures of risk aversionto identify concavity, researchers find reasonable discounting but atthe cost of exceptionally high utility function curvature. We present anew methodology for identifying time preferences, both discountingand curvature, from simple allocation decisions. We find reasonablelevels of both discounting and curvature and, surprisingly, dynamicallyconsistent time preferences. (JEL C91, D12, D81)
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Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the futureis inherently risky. This is problematic when studying time preferencessince uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present-biasedbehavior. We systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporalchoice experiment. Discounted expected utility performs well withrisk, but when certainty is added common ratio predictions failsharply. The data cannot be explained by prospect theory, hyperbolicdiscounting, or preferences for resolution of uncertainty, but seemconsistent with a direct preference for certainty. The data suggeststrongly a difference between risk and time preferences. (JEL C91D81 D91)
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We study experimentally a new two-player game: each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 shekels. He receives the requested amount and if he requests exactly one shekel less than theother player, he receives an additional 20 shekels. Level-k reasoning is appealing due to the natural starting point (requesting 20) and the straightforward best-response operation. Nevertheless, almost all subjects exhibit at most three levels of reasoning. Two variants of thegame demonstrate that the depth of reasoning is not increased by enhancing the attractiveness of the level-0 strategy or by reducing the cost of undercutting the other player.
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Recent crises have seen large spikes in asset price risk. We propose an explanation for such panics based on self-fulfilling shifts in beliefs about risk. A negative link between the current level and the future risk of an asset price leads to a circular relationship between the stochastic process of asset price risk and the price itself. Self-fulfilling shifts in perceived risk can be coordinated around a pure sunspot or around a macro fundamental. In a risk panic, a macro fundamental can be a focal point that affects both the magnitude of the panic and subsequent shifts in perceived risk.
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We use recruitment into a laboratory experiment in Kolkata, India to analyze how social networks select individuals for jobs. The experiment allows subjects to refer actual network members forcasual jobs as experimental subjects under exogenously varied incentive contracts. We provide evidence that some workers, those who are high ability, have useful information about the abilities of members of their social network. However, the experiment also shows that social networks provide incentives to refer less qualified workers, and firms must counterbalance these incentives in order to effectively use existing employees to help overcome their screening problem.
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Separate identification of the price and quantity of human capitalhas important implications for understanding key issues in economics.Price and quantity series are derived for four education levels.The price series are highly correlated and they exhibit a strong seculartrend. Three resulting implications are explored: the rising collegepremium is found to be driven more by relative quantity thanrelative price changes, life-cycle wage profiles are readily interpretableas reflecting optimal human capital investment paths usingthe estimated price series, and adjusting the labor input for qualityincreases dramatically reduces the contribution of MFP to growth.(JEL D91, I20, J24, J31, O47)
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This paper explores the links between exports, export destinations,and skill utilization. We identify two mechanisms behind these links:differences across destinations in quality valuation and in exportingrequired services, activities that are intensive in skilled labor.Depending on the characteristics of the source country (income,language), the theories suggest a skill-bias in export destinations.We test the theory using a panel of Argentine manufacturing firms.We find that Argentine firms exporting to high-income countrieshired more skilled workers than other exporters and domestic firms.Instead, we cannot identify any causal effect of exporting per se onskill utilization. (JEL F14, F16, J24, L60, O14, O19)
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Premiums in health insurance markets frequently do not reflect individual differences in costs, either because consumers have privateinformation or because prices are not risk rated. This creates inefficiencies when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple econometric model to study this problem and estimate it using data on small employers. We find a welfare loss of 2-11 percent of coverage costs compared to what is feasible with risk rating. Only about one-quarter of this is due to inefficiently chosen uniform contribution levels. We also investigate the reclassification risk created by risk rating individual incremental premiums, finding only a modest welfare cost. (JEL G22, I13, I18)
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Journals
- American Economic Review (256)
- Journal of Finance (60)
- Journal of Financial Economics (124)
- Review of Financial Studies (96)
Topic
- Bond (21)
- CEO (12)
- Capital Structure (9)
- Director (8)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (4)
Resource type
- Journal Article (536)