A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

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Results 541 resources

  • The payoff of actions is estimated and the resulting empirical payoff is controlled for in regression analyses to formulate a test of rational expectations in information cascade experiments. We show that the empirical payoff of actions is a function of estimates of choice probabilities and estimates of the information parameters of the game. We introduce an alternative empirical payoff of actions with true values of the information parameters. Our improved measure of the success of social learning confirms that rational expectations are violated, but deviations from rational expectations are statistically significantly smaller than in Weizsacher (2010).

  • We adopt a statistical approach to identify the shocks that explain most of the fluctuations of the slope of the term structure of interest rates. We find that one shock can explain the majority of unpredictable movements in the slope. Impulse response functions lead us to interpret this shock as news about future total factor productivity (TFP). By showing that "slope shocks" are essentially "TFP news shocks" we provide a new explanation for the relationship between the slope and macroeconomic fundamentals. Our results also provide a new empirical benchmark for structural models at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance.

  • A manager and a worker are in an infinitely repeated relationshipin which the manager privately observes her opportunity costs ofpaying the worker. We show that the optimal relational contract generatesperiodic conflicts during which effort and expected profitsdecline gradually but recover instantaneously. To manage a conflict,the manager uses a combination of informal promises and formalcommitments that evolves with the duration of the conflict. Finally,we show that liquidity constraints limit the manager's ability to manageconflicts but may also induce the worker to respond to a conflictby providing more effort rather than less.

  • We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are repeatedlymatched and decide whether or not to form profitable partnerships.Each agent has a physical color and a social color. An agent's socialcolor acts as a signal, conveying information about the physicalcolor of agents in his partnership history. Before an agent makes adecision, he observes his match's physical and social colors. Neitherthe physical color nor the social color is payoff relevant. We identifyenvironments where equilibria arise in which agents condition theirdecisions on the physical and social colors of their potential partners.That is, they discriminate.

  • We present a new framework to identify supply elasticities of storablecommodities where past shocks are used as exogenous price shifters.In the agricultural context, past yield shocks change inventorylevels and futures prices of agricultural commodities. We use ourestimated elasticities to evaluate the impact of the 2009 RenewableFuel Standard on commodity prices, quantities, and food consumers'surplus for the four basic staples: corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat.Prices increase 20 percent if one-third of commodities used toproduce ethanol are recycled as feedstock, with a positively skewed95 percent confidence interval that ranges from 14 to 35 percent.

  • Expected consumer's surplus rarely represents preferences over price lotteries. Still, I give sufficient conditions for policies which maximize aggregate expected surplus to be interim Pareto Optimal. Besides two standard partial equilibrium conditions, I assume that feasible prices satisfy a single-crossing property; and each consumer's indirect utility satisfies increasing differences in the price and income. I use the result to extend well-known welfare conclusions beyond the knife-edge quasilinear utility case. Since increasing differences puts no upper bound on risk aversion, the result is useful for applications in which risk aversion is important.

  • We analyze the emergence of the first socioeconomic institutionin history limiting fertility: west of a line from St. Petersburg toTrieste, the European Marriage Pattern (EMP) reduced childbirthsby approximately one-third between the fourteenth and eighteenthcentury. To explain the rise of EMP we build a two-sector modelof agricultural production?grain and livestock. Women have acomparative advantage in animal husbandry. After the Black Deathin 1348?1350, land abundance triggered a shift toward the pastoralsector. This improved female employment prospects, leading to latermarriages. Using detailed data from England, we provide strongevidence for our mechanism.

  • Using data from the American Time Use Survey between 2003and 2010, we document that home production absorbs roughly30 percentof foregone market work hours at business cycle frequencies.Leisure absorbs roughly 50 percent of foregone market workhours, with sleeping and television watching accounting for mostof this increase. We document significant increases in time spenton shopping, child care, education, and health. Job search absorbsbetween 2 and 6 percent of foregone market work hours. We discussthe implications of our results for business cycle models with homeproduction and non-separable preferences.

  • This paper explores the causes and consequences of regional tastedifferences. I introduce habit formation into a standard general equilibriummodel. Household tastes evolve over time to favor foods consumedas a child. Thus, locally abundant foods are preferred in everyregion, as they were relatively inexpensive in prior generations. Thesepatterns alter the correspondence between price changes and nutrition.For example, neglecting this relationship between tastes and agro-climaticendowments overstates the short-run nutritional gains from agriculturaltrade liberalization, since preferred foods rise in price in everyregion. I examine the model's predictions using household survey datafrom many regions of India.

  • We offer a unified analysis of the growth of low-skill serviceoccupations between 1980 and 2005 and the concurrent polarizationof US employment and wages. We hypothesize that polarizationstems from the interaction between consumer preferences, whichfavor variety over specialization, and the falling cost of automatingroutine, codifiable job tasks. Applying a spatial equilibrium model, wecorroborate four implications of this hypothesis. Local labor marketsthat specialized in routine tasks differentially adopted informationtechnology, reallocated low-skill labor into service occupations(employment polarization), experienced earnings growth at the tailsof the distribution (wage polarization), and received inflows of skilledlabor.

Last update from database: 5/15/24, 11:01 PM (AEST)