A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 541 resources
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We study the exposure of the US corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and Treasury bonds over the period 1973–2007 in a regime-switching model. In one regime, liquidity shocks have mostly insignificant effects on bond prices, whereas in another regime, a rise in illiquidity produces significant but conflicting effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise while prices of speculative-grade (junk) bonds fall substantially (relative to the market). Relating the probability of these regimes to macroeconomic conditions we find that the second regime can be predicted by economic conditions that are characterized as “stress.” These effects, which are robust to controlling for other systematic risks (term and default), suggest the existence of time-varying liquidity risk of corporate bond returns conditional on episodes of flight to liquidity. Our model can predict the out-of-sample bond returns for the stress years 2008–2009. We find a similar pattern for stocks classified by high or low book-to-market ratio, where again, liquidity shocks play a special role in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions.
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Using deal-level data from transactions initiated by large private equity houses, we find that the abnormal performance of deals is positive on average, after controlling for leverage and sector returns. Higher abnormal performance is related to improvement in sales and operating margin during the private phase, relative to that for quoted peers. General partners who are ex-consultants or ex–industry managers are associated with outperforming deals focused on internal value-creation programs, and ex-bankers or ex-accountants with outperforming deals involving significant mergers and acquisitions. The findings suggest the presence, on average, of positive but heterogeneous skills at the deal-partner level in large private equity transactions.
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We build an equilibrium model of commodity markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging demands for commodity futures. Increases in producers' hedging demand or speculators' capital constraints increase hedging costs via price-pressure on futures. These in turn affect producers' equilibrium hedging and supply decision inducing a link between a financial friction in the futures market and the commodity spot prices. Consistent with the model, measures of producers' propensity to hedge forecasts futures returns and spot prices in oil and gas market data from 1979 to 2010. The component of the commodity futures risk premium associated with producer hedging demand rises when speculative activity reduces. We conclude that limits to financial arbitrage generate limits to hedging by producers, and affect equilibrium commodity supply and prices.
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What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? We develop a model where myopic governments seek popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when debt is low because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default as debt builds up and net new borrowing becomes difficult, because of the adverse consequences from default to the domestic financial sector. More myopic governments default less often, but tax in a more distortionary way and increase the vulnerability of the domestic financial sector to future government debt default.
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We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking run and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly securitized assets using explicit guarantees. We show that regulatory arbitrage was an important motive behind setting up conduits. In particular, the guarantees were structured so as to reduce regulatory capital requirements, more so by banks with less capital, and while still providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors. Consistent with such recourse, we find that conduits provided little risk transfer during the run, as losses from conduits remained with banks instead of outside investors and banks with more exposure to conduits had lower stock returns.
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This paper shows that smoking intensity, i.e. the amount of nicotine extracted percigarette smoked, responds to changes in excise taxes and tobacco prices. We exploitNHANES data covering the period 1988 to 2006 across many US states. Moreover, usingpanel data from the Coronary Artery Risk Development in Young Adults (CARDIA)study, we provide new evidence on the importance of cotinine measures in explaininglong-run smoking behavior. We show the importance of smoking intensity as a long-rundeterminant of smoking cessation. We also investigate the sensitivity of smokingcessation to changes in excise taxes and their interaction with smoking intensity.
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We show how to price the time series and cross section of the term structure of interest rates using a three-step linear regression approach. Our method allows computationally fast estimation of term structure models with a large number of pricing factors. We present specification tests favoring a model using five principal components of yields as factors. We demonstrate that this model outperforms the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) four-factor specification in out-of-sample exercises but generates similar in-sample term premium dynamics. Our regression approach can also incorporate unspanned factors and allows estimation of term structure models without observing a zero-coupon yield curve.
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We find that greater institutional ownership is associated withmore innovation. To explore the mechanism, we contrast the "lazymanager" hypothesis with a model where institutional ownersincrease innovation incentives through reducing career risks. Theevidence favors career concerns. First, we find complementaritybetween institutional ownership and product market competition,whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts substitution. Second,CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturnswhen institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumentalvariables, policy changes, and disaggregating by type of institutionalowner, we argue that the effect of institutions on innovation is causal.(JEL G23, G32, L25, M10, O31, O34)
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Journals
- American Economic Review (237)
- Journal of Finance (67)
- Journal of Financial Economics (153)
- Review of Financial Studies (84)
Topic
- CEO (24)
- Bond (16)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (13)
- Capital Structure (11)
- Director (7)
Resource type
- Journal Article (541)