A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 552 resources
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Consumers' enrollment decisions in Medicare Part D can be explained by Abaluck and Gruber's (2011) model of utility maximization with psychological biases or by a neoclassical version of their model that precludes such biases. We evaluate these competing hypotheses by applying nonparametric tests of utility maximization and model validation tests to administrative data. We find that 79 percent of enrollment decisions from 2006 to 2010 satisfied basic axioms of consumer theory under the assumption of full information. The validation tests provide evidence against widespread psychological biases. In particular, we find that precluding psychological biases improves the structural model's out-of-sample predictions for consumer behavior.
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We use a firm-CEO assignment framework to model the market for CEO effective labor. In the model's equilibrium, more talented CEOs match with and supply more effort to larger firms. Taxation of CEO incomes affects the equilibrium pricing of CEO effective labor and, hence, spills over and affects firm profits. Absent the ability to tax profits or a direct concern for firm owners, a standard prescription for high marginal income taxes emerges. However, given such an ability or concern, the optimal marginal tax rates are much lower.
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In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters' choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the politician's optimal experiment. With a nonunanimous voting rule, she exploits voters' heterogeneity by designing an experiment with realizations targeting different winning coalitions. Consequently, under a simple-majority rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse off due to the politician's influence. We characterize voters' preferences over electoral rules and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the politician to supply a more informative experiment.
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We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of the add-on but hardens information revelation for the basic service. The interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions, contract renegotiation, and the value of incomplete contracts.
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We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues.
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The old age provisions of the Medicaid program were designed to insure retirees against medical expenses. We estimate a structural model of savings and medical spending and use it to compute the distribution of lifetime Medicaid transfers and Medicaid valuations across currently single retirees. Compensating variation calculations indicate that current retirees value Medicaid insurance at more than its actuarial cost, but that most would value an expansion of the current Medicaid program at less than its cost. These findings suggest that for current single retirees, the Medicaid program may be of the approximately right size.
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I estimate the effects of removing low-income youth with disabilities from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on their earnings and income in adulthood. Using a regression discontinuity design based on a 1996 policy change in age 18 medical reviews, I find that youth who are removed from SSI at age 18 recover one-third of the lost SSI cash income in earnings. SSI youth who are removed and stay off SSI earn on average 4,400 annually, and they lose 76,000 in present discounted observed income over the 16 years following removal relative to those who do not receive a review.
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We develop a dynamic multicountry general equilibrium model to investigate forces acting on the global economy during the Great Recession and ensuing recovery. Our multisector framework accounts completely for countries' trade, investment, production, and GDPs in terms of different sets of shocks. Applying the model to 21 countries, we investigate the 29 percent drop in world trade in manufactures during the period 2008-2009. A shift in final spending away from tradable sectors, largely caused by declines in durables investment efficiency, accounts for most of the collapse in trade relative to GDP. Shocks to trade frictions, productivity, and demand play minor roles.
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We show how size-contingent laws can be used to identify the equilibrium and welfare effects of labor regulation. Our framework incorporates such regulations into the Lucas (1978) model and applies it to France where many labor laws start to bind on firms with 50 or more employees. Using population data on firms between 1995 and 2007, we structurally estimate the key parameters of our model to construct counterfactual size, productivity, and welfare distributions. We find that the cost of these regulations is equivalent to that of a 2.3 percent variable tax on labor. In our baseline case with French levels of partial real wage inflexibility, welfare costs of the regulations are 3.4 percent of GDP (falling to 1.3 percent if real wages were perfectly flexible downward). The main losers from the regulation are workers–and to a lesser extent, large firms–and the main winners are small firms.
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We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with constant values, optimal prices fluctuate with time. We argue that consumers' randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice.
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Journals
- American Economic Review (266)
- Journal of Finance (72)
- Journal of Financial Economics (123)
- Review of Financial Studies (91)
Topic
- Bond (16)
- CEO (13)
- Capital Structure (6)
- Director (4)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (4)
Resource type
- Journal Article (552)