A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• AbdulkadiroÄŸlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Schellenberg, J., & Walters, C. R. (2020). Do Parents Value School Effectiveness? American Economic Review, 110, 1502–1539.

  School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents' choices reward effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose schools based on causal effectiveness rather than peer characteristics. We study relationships among parent preferences, peer quality, and causal effects on outcomes for applicants to New York City's centralized high school assignment mechanism. We use applicants' rank-ordered choice lists to measure preferences and to construct selection-corrected estimates of treatment effects on test scores, high school graduation, college attendance, and college quality. Parents prefer schools that enroll high-achieving peers, and these schools generate larger improvements in short- and long-run student outcomes. Preferences are unrelated to school effectiveness and academic match quality after controlling for peer quality.

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• Acharya, V. V., Imbierowicz, B., Steffen, S., & Teichmann, D. (2020). Does the Lack of Financial Stability Impair the Transmission of Monetary Policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 138, 342–365.

  We investigate the transmission of central bank liquidity to bank deposits and loan spreads in Europe over the period from January 2006 to June 2010. We find evidence consistent with an impaired transmission channel due to bank risk. Central bank liquidity does not translate into lower loan spreads for high-risk banks for maturities beyond one year, even as it lowers deposit spreads for both high- and low-risk banks. This adversely affects the balance sheets of high-risk bank borrowers, leading to lower payouts, lower capital expenditures, and lower employment. Overall, our results suggest that banks’ capital constraints at the time of an easing of monetary policy pose a challenge to the effectiveness of the bank-lending channel and the central bank's lender of last resort function.

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• Addoum, J. M., Goldstein, I., & Murfin, J. R. (2020). Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans. Review of Financial Studies, 33, 3766–3803.

  Equity markets fail to account for the value-relevant nonpublic information enjoyed by syndicated loan participants and reflected in publicly posted loan prices. A long-short strategy that buys (sells) the equities of firms with recently appreciated (depreciated) loans earns large risk-adjusted returns, suggesting a surprising and economically important level of segmentation across the same firm’s capital structure. The information lag captured by trading strategy returns is not affected by drivers of firm-specific attention, including the publication of loan returns in the Wall Street Journal. Instead, returns to the strategy are eliminated among equities held by mutual funds also trading in syndicated loans.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

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• Addoum, J. M., Hong, H., Ng, D. T., & Ortiz-Bobea, A. (2020). Temperature Shocks and Establishment Sales. Review of Financial Studies, 33, 1331–1366.

  Combining granular daily data on temperatures across the continental United States with detailed establishment data from 1990 to 2015, we study the causal impact of temperature shocks on establishment sales and productivity. Using a large sample yielding precise estimates, we do not find evidence that temperature exposures significantly affect establishment-level sales or productivity, including among industries traditionally classified as “heat sensitive.” At the firm level, we find that temperature exposures aggregated across firm establishments are generally unrelated to sales, productivity, and profitability. Our results support existing findings of a tenuous relation between temperature and aggregate economic growth in rich countries.

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• Agarwal, S., Mikhed, V., & Scholnick, B. (2020). Peers’ Income and Financial Distress: Evidence from Lottery Winners and Neighboring Bankruptcies. Review of Financial Studies, 33, 433–472.

  We examine whether relative income differences among peers can generate financial distress. Using lottery winnings as plausibly exogenous variations in the relative income of peers, we find that the dollar magnitude of a lottery win of one neighbor increases subsequent borrowing and bankruptcies among other neighbors. We also examine which factors may mitigate lenders’ bankruptcy risk in these neighborhoods. We show that bankruptcy filers obtain more secured, but not unsecured, debt, and lenders provide additional credit to low-risk, but not high-risk, debtors. In addition, we find evidence consistent with local lenders taking advantage of soft information to mitigate credit risk.

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• Agarwal, S., Qian, W., Seru, A., & Zhang, J. (2020). Disguised Corruption Evidence from Consumer Credit in China. Journal of Financial Economics, 137, 430–450.

  Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats.

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• Aghamolla, C., & Hashimoto, T. (2020). Information Arrival Delay and Clustering in Financial Markets with Dynamic Freeriding. Journal of Financial Economics, 138, 27–52.

  We study informational freeriding in a model where agents privately acquire information and then decide when to reveal it by taking an action. Examples of such freeriding are prevalent in financial markets, e.g., the timing of initial public offerings, analysts’ forecasts, and mutual funds’ investment decisions. The main results show that, in large populations, few agents provide significant information while the vast majority of agents freeride. We highlight the role of uncertainty and market size in shaping the dynamics of price discovery. Among other results, we find that heightened uncertainty over the underlying state enhances information production, yet weakens the precision and speed of information aggregation in the market.

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• Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2020). Self-Fulfilling Debt Dilution: Maturity and Multiplicity in Debt Models. American Economic Review, 110, 2783–2818.

  We establish that creditor beliefs regarding future borrowing can be self-fulfilling, leading to multiple equilibria with markedly different debt accumulation patterns. We characterize such indeterminacy in the Eaton-Gersovitz sovereign debt model augmented with long maturity bonds. Two necessary conditions for the multiplicity are (i) the government is more impatient than foreign creditors, and (ii) there are deadweight losses from default. The multiplicity is dynamic and stems from the self-fulfilling beliefs of how future creditors will price bonds; long maturity bonds are therefore a crucial component of the multiplicity. We introduce a third party with deep pockets to discuss the policy implications of this source of multiplicity and identify the potentially perverse consequences of traditional "lender of last resort" policies.

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• Ai, H., Li, J. E., Li, K., & Schlag, C. (2020). The Collateralizability Premium. Review of Financial Studies, 33, 5821–5855.

  A common prediction of macroeconomic models of credit market frictions is that the tightness of financial constraints is countercyclical. Theory suggests a negative collateralizability premium; that is, capital that can be used as collateral to relax financial constraints insures against aggregate shocks and commands a lower risk compensation compared with noncollateralizable assets. We show that a long-short portfolio constructed using a novel measure of asset collateralizability generates an average excess return of around 8% per year. We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and financial constraints to quantitatively account for the collateralizability premium.

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• Ai, H., Li, K., & Yang, F. (2020). Financial Intermediation and Capital Reallocation. Journal of Financial Economics, 138, 663–686.

  To understand the link between financial intermediation activities and the real economy, we build a general equilibrium model in which agency frictions in the financial sector affect the efficiency of capital reallocation across firms and generate aggregate economic fluctuations. We develop a recursive policy iteration approach to fully characterize the nonlinear equilibrium dynamics and the off-steady-state crisis behavior. In our model, adverse shocks to agency frictions exacerbate capital misallocation and manifest themselves as variations in total factor productivity at the aggregate level. Our model endogenously generates countercyclical volatility in the aggregate time series and countercyclical dispersion in the marginal product of capital and asset returns in the cross-section.

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