A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 513 resources
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This paper explores the role of trade invoicing currencies in the international spillover of monetary policy. Using high‐frequency measures of Federal Reserve monetary policy shocks, I show that exchange rates, interest rates, and equity returns in countries with a larger share of dollar‐invoiced imports systematically respond more to U.S. monetary policy. I document similar transmission effects from European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy shocks to countries with euro‐invoiced imports. I rationalize these findings within a New Keynesian framework. As a result of these spillovers, domestic monetary policy should be less effective in countries with traded goods invoiced in foreign currencies.
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This paper shows the cross-sectional and time series momentum in currencies, which cannot be explained by carry and dollar factors, summarize the autocorrelation of these factors. These momentum strategies long currency factors following positive factor returns and short them following losses. Carry and dollar factors are strongly autocorrelated and only earn significantly positive excess returns following positive factor returns. By contrast, idiosyncratic currency returns contain little momentum. Consequently, factor momentum not only outperforms the cross-sectional and time series momentum but also explains them. Limits to arbitrage and time-varying risk premium help explain factor momentum.
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This paper studies manipulation in derivative contract markets. When traders hedge factor risk using derivative contracts, traders can manipulate settlement prices by trading the underlying spot goods. In equilibrium, manipulation can make all agents worse off. The model illustrates how contract market manipulation can be defined in a manner distinct from other forms of strategic trading behavior, and how the structure of contract and spot markets affect the size of manipulation-induced market distortions.
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A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively.
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The challenge for stabilization policy presented by the COVID-19 pandemic stems above all from disruption of the circular flow of payments, resulting in a failure of what Keynes (1936) calls "effective demand." As a consequence, economic activity in many sectors can be inefficiently low, and interest-rate policy cannot eliminate the distortions—not because of a limit on the extent to which interest rates can be reduced, but because interest-rate reductions fail to stimulate demand of the right sorts. Fiscal transfers are instead well suited to addressing the fundamental problem, and can under certain circumstances achieve a first-best allocation of resources.
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Robinhood investors increased their holdings in the March 2020 COVID bear market, indicating an absence of collective panic and margin calls. This steadfastness was rewarded in the subsequent bull market. Despite unusual interest in some “experience” stocks (e.g., cannabis stocks), they tilted primarily toward stocks with high past share volume and dollar‐trading volume (themselves mostly big stocks). From mid‐2018 to mid‐2020, an aggregated crowd consensus portfolio (a proxy for the household‐equal‐weighted portfolio) had both good timing and good alpha.
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We quantify the impact of bank market power on monetary policy transmission through banks to borrowers. We estimate a dynamic banking model in which monetary policy affects imperfectly competitive banks' funding costs. Banks optimize the pass‐through of these costs to borrowers and depositors, while facing capital and reserve regulation. We find that bank market power explains much of the transmission of monetary policy to borrowers, with an effect comparable to that of bank capital regulation. When the federal funds rate falls below 0.9%, market power interacts with bank capital regulation to produce a reversal of the effect of monetary policy.
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How does market concentration affect the potency of monetary policy? To address this question we embed a dynamic oligopolistic game into a general-equilibrium macroeconomic model. We provide a sufficient-statistic formula for the response to monetary shocks involving demand elasticities, concentration and markups. We discipline our model with evidence on pass-through and find that higher concentration amplifies nonneutrality and stickiness. We isolate strategic effects from oligopoly by comparing our model to one with naive firms. We derive an exact Phillips curve featuring novel higher-order terms, but show that a standard New Keynesian one recalibrated with higher stickiness provides an excellent approximation.
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Empirical studies demonstrate striking patterns in stock returns related to scheduled macroeconomic announcements. A large proportion of the total equity premium is realized on days with macroeconomic announcements. The relation between market betas and expected returns is far stronger on announcement days as compared with nonannouncement days. Finally, these results hold for fixed-income investments as well as for stocks. We present a model in which agents learn the probability of an adverse economic state on announcement days. We show that the model quantitatively accounts for the empirical findings. Evidence from options data provides support for the model’s mechanism.
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This paper tests a theory conjecturing that cross-listing can insulate firms from potential hostile takeovers owing to the increased cost concern of bidders. We find a significant and positive relation between the corporate control threat and the likelihood that firms cross-list in a foreign country. Firms facing takeover threats are more likely to choose hosting countries with greater accounting differences from the US GAAP. Subsample evidence suggests that cross-listing is more likely to be used as an antitakeover device if firms have foreign market exposure or when all-cash offers are less likely. Tests based on quasi-natural experiments provide further support.
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Journals
- American Economic Review (115)
- Journal of Finance (69)
- Journal of Financial Economics (202)
- Review of Financial Studies (127)
Topic
- Bond (33)
- CEO (5)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (4)
- Director (3)
- Capital Structure (2)
Resource type
- Journal Article (513)