Knowledge that Transforms

We show existence of a Temporary Equilibrium in a three commodity model (consumption good, labour and money) if consumers have static expectations in the sense of Patinkin.

This paper is concerned with the design of non-cooperative game forms for economic decision problems. A decision problem is presented which admits non-dictatorial game forms with the following properties: Nash equilibria exist and all Nash equilibrium outcomes are Pareto optimal; or dominant strategies exist and all dominant strategy equilibria are Pareto optimal; but not both. This is, any (non-dictatorial) game form whose Nash equilibria are well behaved does not have dominant strategies, and any game form with well behaved dominant strategy equilibria must have at least one non-optimal non-dominant strategy Nash equilibrium.

An optimal policy is derived for a sequential family size decision making problem. It is shown that households will follow a stopping rule, replacing dead children until an optimal number of living children is reached. The behavioural equation derived from the optimal policy is then used to explain retrospective household data collected in Bangladesh in 1977–1978. This data provides some support for the underlying hypothesis.

Stimulated by the work of Novshek (1980), this paper concerns the accuracy of the competitive approximation to a Cournot market with free entry. Novshek took a static equilibrium approach to the problem. This paper takes a dynamic stochastic approach, one which allows persistent disequilibrium. It is argued that the alternative approach yields similar results with less effort and, in some senses, with greater generality. 1.

For a commonly occurring pattern of missing data, estimators of regression coefficients are derived by a non-likelihood method. The small-sample properties are investigated for the case of normality assumptions. The estimators are shown to be unbiased, exact small-sample variance formulae are derived, comparisons are made with ordinary least-squares estimators and it is demonstrated that the estimators can be more efficient than maximum-likelihood estimators in small samples.

Journal Article The Discrete Heal Algorithm With Intermediate Goods Get access Jacques Cremer Jacques Cremer University of Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 50, Issue 2, April 1983, Pages 383–391, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297424 Published: 01 April 1983 Article history Received: 01 October 1981 Accepted: 01 October 1982 Published: 01 April 1983

A model of a large economy in which prices transmit information (about the "state of the world" which is an argument in consumers' utility functions) from more informed to less informed agents is analysed. The basic hypothesis is that the forecast functions of imperfectly informed agents are suitably dispersed. For any such distribution of forecasts, market clearing prices exist. Moreover, there is always an equilibrium in which each agent's expectations are approximately rational.

Manipulation is studied in abstract planning procedures in exchange economies with private goods and a generalization of the results of Champsaur-Laroque (1980) is obtained. When the Nash equilibrium corresponding to myopic manipulation is unique, the outcome of consistent intertemporal manipulation on a time interval [0, T] is characterized. It is shown that when T goes to infinity, the resulting allocation tends towards a competitive equilibrium. For T equal to infinity, there exists a Nash equilibrium only when the initial allocation is Pareto-optimal.

There are many situations where agents supply input factors and produce a transferable good (money). This paper examines the conditions on technology under which agents can specify reward schedules which lead to an efficient outcome even if inputs are chosen non-cooperatively and preferences are private information. The characterisation of the class of technologies that allows this involves a generalization of additivity known as (n − 1)-additivity.